Freitag, 20. Februar 2015
Dienstag, 10. Februar 2015
Austerity durch falsches Schuldenmachen...?
Paul Krugman
Many economists, including Janet Yellen, view global economic troubles since 2008 largely as a story about “deleveraging” — a simultaneous attempt by debtors almost everywhere to reduce their liabilities. Why is deleveraging a problem? Because my spending is your income, and your spending is my income, so if everyone slashes spending at the same time, incomes go down around the world.
Or as Ms. Yellen put it in 2009, “Precautions that may be smart for individuals and firms — and indeed essential to return the economy to a normal state — nevertheless magnify the distress of the economy as a whole.”
So how much progress have we made in returning the economy to that “normal state”? None at all. You see, policy makers have been basing their actions on a false view of what debt is all about, and their attempts to reduce the problem have actually made it worse.
First, the facts: Last week, the McKinsey Global Institute issued a report titled “Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging,” which found, basically, that no nation has reduced its ratio of total debt to G.D.P. Household debt is down in some countries, especially in the United States. But it’s up in others, and even where there has been significant private deleveraging, government debt has risen by more than private debt has fallen.
You might think our failure to reduce debt ratios shows that we aren’t trying hard enough — that families and governments haven’t been making a serious effort to tighten their belts, and that what the world needs is, yes, more austerity. But we have, in fact, had unprecedented austerity. As the International Monetary Fund has pointed out, real government spending excluding interest has fallen across wealthy nations — there have been deep cuts by the troubled debtors of Southern Europe, but there have also been cuts in countries, like Germany and the United States, that can borrow at some of the lowest interest rates in history.
All this austerity has, however, only made things worse — and predictably so, because demands that everyone tighten their belts were based on a misunderstanding of the role debt plays in the economy.
aus: The New York Times 9.2.2015
Many economists, including Janet Yellen, view global economic troubles since 2008 largely as a story about “deleveraging” — a simultaneous attempt by debtors almost everywhere to reduce their liabilities. Why is deleveraging a problem? Because my spending is your income, and your spending is my income, so if everyone slashes spending at the same time, incomes go down around the world.
Or as Ms. Yellen put it in 2009, “Precautions that may be smart for individuals and firms — and indeed essential to return the economy to a normal state — nevertheless magnify the distress of the economy as a whole.”
So how much progress have we made in returning the economy to that “normal state”? None at all. You see, policy makers have been basing their actions on a false view of what debt is all about, and their attempts to reduce the problem have actually made it worse.
First, the facts: Last week, the McKinsey Global Institute issued a report titled “Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging,” which found, basically, that no nation has reduced its ratio of total debt to G.D.P. Household debt is down in some countries, especially in the United States. But it’s up in others, and even where there has been significant private deleveraging, government debt has risen by more than private debt has fallen.
You might think our failure to reduce debt ratios shows that we aren’t trying hard enough — that families and governments haven’t been making a serious effort to tighten their belts, and that what the world needs is, yes, more austerity. But we have, in fact, had unprecedented austerity. As the International Monetary Fund has pointed out, real government spending excluding interest has fallen across wealthy nations — there have been deep cuts by the troubled debtors of Southern Europe, but there have also been cuts in countries, like Germany and the United States, that can borrow at some of the lowest interest rates in history.
All this austerity has, however, only made things worse — and predictably so, because demands that everyone tighten their belts were based on a misunderstanding of the role debt plays in the economy.
aus: The New York Times 9.2.2015
Samstag, 7. Februar 2015
Syriza
Isolde Charim
Die Abwehr des Wahlerfolgs der griechischen
Syriza folgte der Argumentation: Linksradikale und Rechtsradikale sind
letztlich gleich. Die Extreme berühren einander nicht nur, sie gehen
ineinander über. Die jubelnde Aufnahme des Syriza-Sieges folgte
demselben Schema: Rechte und Linke, Marine Le Pen und Melenchon,
Linkspartei und AfD, Ukip und Sinn Fein - sie alle äußerten sich
begeistert über den griechischen Wahlausgang.
Und
dann schließt Alexis Tsipras auch noch diese unsägliche Koalition mit
den Rechtspopulisten von Anel - einem Bündnis, das die Links-Rechts-
Gleichung geradezu zu verkörpern scheint. Die "Zeit" attestiert die Bildung einer "Internationale des Dagegen".
Gleichung geradezu zu verkörpern scheint. Die "Zeit" attestiert die Bildung einer "Internationale des Dagegen".
Und
zugleich müssen selbst Kritiker zugestehen: Das waren bittere Jahre für
die Griechen - ein Wirtschaftseinbruch, den "andere Völker sonst nur in
Kriegszeiten erleben", so Raimund Löw. Das Spardiktat war aber nicht
nur hart, es fand auch keine Akzeptanz in der Bevölkerung. Denn die
Austeritätspolitik bedeutete nicht nur Sparen, sondern auch den Rückzug
auf reine Pragmatik, eine "Politik" des Sachzwangs. Aber eine "Politik"
der alternativlosen Notwendigkeit ist keine Politik - selbst in Zeiten,
wo die Sachzwänge erdrückend sein mögen. Politik muss zwischen
Notwendigkeiten und Selbstbestimmungswünschen vermitteln können. Das
kann das technokratische Vorgehen nicht. Deshalb konnte es keine
Akzeptanz herstellen: Die Austeritätspolitik ist gescheitert. Sie wurde
von den Griechen abgewählt.
Im Moment bedeutet die Wahl selbst bereits die erhoffte Alternative. Es wird sich aber erst zeigen, ob diesem Moment wirklich eine andere Politik folgen kann. Die Zeichen dafür stehen nicht gut. Die EU reagiert mit Abwehr. Tsipras und sein Finanzminister Yanis Varoufakis werden wie Feinde behandelt. Denn ein Einvernehmen mit diesem neuen Griechenland würde bedeuten: Europa muss sich verändern. Deshalb hat man es auf deren Scheitern angelegt.
Ja, Syriza ist
vielleicht nicht die Lichtgestalt, die sich die Linke erhofft hat. Weder
die unappetitliche Koalition noch das Blinken Richtung Putin sprechen
dafür. Aber es ist die derzeit einzige politische Kraft, die dem
Austeritätskurs etwas entgegenzusetzen vermag. Selbst Kritiker räumen
ein, dass die Maßnahmen, die sie dabei im Auge haben, durchaus sinnvoll
sind: Kampf gegen Steuerflucht und Korruption, Mindestlöhne,
Versicherungen, Stromversorgung. Dieser Maßnahmenkatalog zeigt nicht
nur, wie grundlegend die Nöte der Griechen bereits sind. Er zeigt auch:
Syriza will keinen sowjetischen Fünf-Jahres-Plan, sondern klassischen
Keynesianismus. Ihr Ziel ist nicht die Diktatur des Proletariats,
sondern ein soziales Griechenland. Sie fordern keine Revolution, sondern
einen "Merkel-Plan" (nach dem Vorbild des Marshall Plans). Wenn das
schon Radikalismus ist, dann muss man sagen: Das politische Spektrum ist
radikal geworden - radikal eng, wenn dafür kein Platz mehr ist.
Den
Strategen der Gleichsetzung aber sei gesagt: Links und rechts sind
weder austauschbar, noch gehören sie zusammen. Es ist etwas anderes,
gegen Austeritätspolitik zu sein als gegen Minderheiten. In ihrer
Abwehrhaltung übersehen sie: Syriza ist nicht die Katastrophe. Aber
sollte Syriza scheitern, dann droht wirklich eine Katastrophe.
Wiener Zeitung 07.02.2015
Freitag, 6. Februar 2015
The Greek Elections and European Absurdity
Aus der Huffington Post, gepostet via:
KostasVergopoulos
After the victory of the new Greek government, a direct result of the popular, democratic will, international reactions are far from unanimous. Even though everyone accepts the result of popular verdict, many people are doubtful about the decision. It seems as if the Greek people are free to democratically elect their government, but their European and international counterparts are also free to ignore the content of the people's democratic verdict and enforce, in an undemocratic manner, the misguided and destructive recipe that the Greek people voted against.
Significantly, while the result of the election brings to the surface doubts and questions in France, Italy and Spain about the efficacy of the choices that have driven the entire Eurozone to the brink of deflation, the German side does not share these doubts. On the contrary, they threaten that any deviation from the "one-way path" that has been taken during the last five years will have consequences for those who diverge from it.
It is odd that the German side does not offer any real arguments about the questions that have arisen in the rest of Europe. It offers only threats, without feeling the need to prove the fiscal efficacy of its choices.
The first blackmailing argument that it poses is that a potential unburdening of austerity in Greece and the rest of Europe would make for a more lax attitude towards structural reforms that aim to boost competitiveness. However, analysis of the past five years is clear: the spread of austerity in the Eurozone has led directly to a generalized recession and deflation for all member states, Germany included. As far as the infamous structural reforms are concerned, especially with regards to the job market and welfare state, as the Financial Times points out, they have been inextricably linked to recessionary pressure.
The IMF's estimate is similar: structural reform is necessary but difficult to implement during a recession. These reforms must be implemented only if they do not lead to further financial recession. If there is one thing that has poisoned the European economy after the 2008 crisis, it is the German idea that a purge comes before a recovery.
The second, blackmailing argument that the German side poses is that no debt write-off can be accepted by any country, as this would lead other countries to attempt the same. Again, this does not take into account a nation's ability to repay its debt, nor the humanitarian and economic disaster that has befallen it because of the faulty plan the lenders have implemented; it only considers the potential for disobedience and contagion to other debt-ridden countries.
However, given that no argument beyond obedience and the halting of disobedience is presented to these questions that concern the serviceability of debt and the need to immediately combat rising unemployment, there is little to dispute the conclusion reached by Nobel winner Paul Krugman that the German Chancellor is managing the European economy in the style of the Godfather, Michael Corleone. One supreme managerial leader, with an argument for power, obedience and "virtue" no matter what the cost to Europe or the world.
The third false argument that is always presented by this side is that the cost from a potential debt write-off would fall on the shoulders of European taxpayers. The French newspaper Figaro rushed to estimate that such a write-off would cost each French taxpayer 735 euros and even more for German citizens. However, these commentators fail to mention that these amounts that have been shelled out and are owed by the Greek people return right back to French and German banks, and only a small portion of them enters the Greek economy. The repeated "bailouts" of the Greek economy are, for the most part, nothing more than bailouts for European credit institutions.
In accordance with the idea of former French president Nicolas Sarkozy, the money is placed in a special account outside of Greece, to which Greece has no access to, and debt is serviced from there. Since austerity has been enforced, debt rises faster than national income and therefore debts become even less serviceable. Thus, the system seems to work against lender nations-- and aren't they the ones to blame for the inability to pay off debts?
Anyone familiar with the economic history of mankind, as Martin Wolf of the Financial Times is, also is familiar with the fact that "what cannot be paid, will not be paid." Everything else is an excuse, in attempt to cover up the blame for the sad situation that Europe finds itself in today. It has inexcusably, unjustifiably and by choice become a huge and menacing "black hole" for the world economy.
Schmutzige kleine Geheimnisse. Zum Verhältnis zwischen Griechenland und Deutschland
John MacDougall
Why did Germany try so hard to stop the European Central Bank from giving the eurozone a trillion-euro boost? Why did Germany decree fiscal austerity for Greece instead? And why, despite Greece’s travails and alleged duplicity, does Germany insist that Greece stay in the eurozone? These actions may have seemed irrational and contradictory, but the same people benefited in every case.
First, consider Germany’s recent economic history. In 1990, the reunification of the East and West added an enormous, low-wage population of Germans to the labor supply. Though integrating them into the West’s business environment took time, these millions of new laborers in the workforce instantly made German exports more competitive. Then, with the launch of the euro in 1999, Germany diluted its currency — among the strongest in the world — by mingling it with those of less stable economies from across the European Union. Again, the effect was a huge boost to German exports.
These dramatic shifts in Germany’s economic position might have been expected to benefit both German workers and owners of German capital. For workers in the poorer East, wages were sure to rise, and they did. Workers in the West may have suffered by comparison, but the boom in exports — which went from 23 percent of the economy in 1990 to 42 percent in 2010 — should have been big enough to boost their incomes as well.
Indeed, in the first decade, incomes for Germans from top to bottom on the economic ladder rose by about 7 to 8 percent in real terms. But with the advent of the euro, things started to change. Incomes at the top kept rising, with gains for the top 10 percent of earners continuing apace for the next decade as shareholders reaped record profits. At the bottom, however, there was a sharp dip that eventually left incomes exactly where they started at the beginning of the 1990s.
The effect on inequality was startling. By itself, the integration of East and West should have reduced German inequality substantially. In a country where labor retained some bargaining power, the export boom might have been expected to encourage this convergence as well. Yet Germans at the top of the income distribution saw such an upturn in their fortunes that inequality actually rose. With incomes continuing to diverge, Germany’s wealth inequality was the worst in the eurozone and almost on a par with that of the United States, which was no mean feat.
With all of this in mind, let’s return to policy. The eurozone was dangling on the edge of deflation for months, and even Germany’s inflation rate had been below the European Central Bank’s target of just under 2 percent since August 2013. But German bankers and politicians were dead set against the use of credit easing or other unconventional monetary tools to create inflation, devalue the euro, and presumably improve short-term economic growth in the eurozone.
Instead, they decided that countries in need of an economic lifeline — like Greece — should keep making massive cuts in public services while servicing debts on terms set by wealthier nations such as Germany. For most economists, this was an impractical prescription that would only make the patient suffer more. So why did the Germans insist on it?
The bankers in Berlin realized that inflation eroded the value of savings, of which their wealthy countrymen had quite a lot, and also made German investments less attractive to foreigners. As long as Germany continued to grow, they had no use for inflation. In fact, growth with low inflation — and thus little upward pressure on wages — was a perfect formula, especially for owners of capital. Indebted and unemployed Germans might have benefited from a weaker euro and more inflation, just like the Greeks, but they clearly weren’t the bankers’ top priority.
And Germany did grow, at least until late last year. By the fourth quarter of 2014, its economy was on the brink of recession. Not by coincidence, when the European Central Bank’s governors met in January, Germany’s bankers and politicians finally relented — or at least failed to convince their colleagues of the remaining dangers of inflation. Now, a new challenge has emerged.
Greece is calling Germany’s bluff. A few years ago, the Germans wanted Greece to stay in the eurozone enough to bail them out of their fiscal deficits, but the cost was penury for the Greeks. Back then, Germany seemed to have all the bargaining power. But Greece’s new leftist government has apparently realized that the real bargaining power lies in Athens, because Germany will now do anything to hold the eurozone together.
Germans have read plenty of articles alleging that Athens never should have been allowed to join the eurozone in the first place. But the bankers in Berlin know that each weak country that leaves the eurozone now is likely to push up the value of the euro. This would increase the value of German savings, but it would also harm exports, and at the moment Germany needs them more than ever. Moreover, uncertainty about the euro in the short term might cause investors to pull their money out of German securities, leading to lower asset values and higher interest rates — a double-whammy for wealth and economic growth.
Today, this cluster of threats is unacceptable to Germany. As its growth rate changed, so did its bankers’ priorities and, as a consequence, the balance of power in the eurozone. The Greeks figured this out, and other countries are cottoning on. But it was a good run for wealthy Germans while it lasted.
aus: FP, 2.2.2015
Why did Germany try so hard to stop the European Central Bank from giving the eurozone a trillion-euro boost? Why did Germany decree fiscal austerity for Greece instead? And why, despite Greece’s travails and alleged duplicity, does Germany insist that Greece stay in the eurozone? These actions may have seemed irrational and contradictory, but the same people benefited in every case.
First, consider Germany’s recent economic history. In 1990, the reunification of the East and West added an enormous, low-wage population of Germans to the labor supply. Though integrating them into the West’s business environment took time, these millions of new laborers in the workforce instantly made German exports more competitive. Then, with the launch of the euro in 1999, Germany diluted its currency — among the strongest in the world — by mingling it with those of less stable economies from across the European Union. Again, the effect was a huge boost to German exports.
These dramatic shifts in Germany’s economic position might have been expected to benefit both German workers and owners of German capital. For workers in the poorer East, wages were sure to rise, and they did. Workers in the West may have suffered by comparison, but the boom in exports — which went from 23 percent of the economy in 1990 to 42 percent in 2010 — should have been big enough to boost their incomes as well.
Indeed, in the first decade, incomes for Germans from top to bottom on the economic ladder rose by about 7 to 8 percent in real terms. But with the advent of the euro, things started to change. Incomes at the top kept rising, with gains for the top 10 percent of earners continuing apace for the next decade as shareholders reaped record profits. At the bottom, however, there was a sharp dip that eventually left incomes exactly where they started at the beginning of the 1990s.
The effect on inequality was startling. By itself, the integration of East and West should have reduced German inequality substantially. In a country where labor retained some bargaining power, the export boom might have been expected to encourage this convergence as well. Yet Germans at the top of the income distribution saw such an upturn in their fortunes that inequality actually rose. With incomes continuing to diverge, Germany’s wealth inequality was the worst in the eurozone and almost on a par with that of the United States, which was no mean feat.
With all of this in mind, let’s return to policy. The eurozone was dangling on the edge of deflation for months, and even Germany’s inflation rate had been below the European Central Bank’s target of just under 2 percent since August 2013. But German bankers and politicians were dead set against the use of credit easing or other unconventional monetary tools to create inflation, devalue the euro, and presumably improve short-term economic growth in the eurozone.
Instead, they decided that countries in need of an economic lifeline — like Greece — should keep making massive cuts in public services while servicing debts on terms set by wealthier nations such as Germany. For most economists, this was an impractical prescription that would only make the patient suffer more. So why did the Germans insist on it?
The bankers in Berlin realized that inflation eroded the value of savings, of which their wealthy countrymen had quite a lot, and also made German investments less attractive to foreigners. As long as Germany continued to grow, they had no use for inflation. In fact, growth with low inflation — and thus little upward pressure on wages — was a perfect formula, especially for owners of capital. Indebted and unemployed Germans might have benefited from a weaker euro and more inflation, just like the Greeks, but they clearly weren’t the bankers’ top priority.
And Germany did grow, at least until late last year. By the fourth quarter of 2014, its economy was on the brink of recession. Not by coincidence, when the European Central Bank’s governors met in January, Germany’s bankers and politicians finally relented — or at least failed to convince their colleagues of the remaining dangers of inflation. Now, a new challenge has emerged.
Greece is calling Germany’s bluff. A few years ago, the Germans wanted Greece to stay in the eurozone enough to bail them out of their fiscal deficits, but the cost was penury for the Greeks. Back then, Germany seemed to have all the bargaining power. But Greece’s new leftist government has apparently realized that the real bargaining power lies in Athens, because Germany will now do anything to hold the eurozone together.
Germans have read plenty of articles alleging that Athens never should have been allowed to join the eurozone in the first place. But the bankers in Berlin know that each weak country that leaves the eurozone now is likely to push up the value of the euro. This would increase the value of German savings, but it would also harm exports, and at the moment Germany needs them more than ever. Moreover, uncertainty about the euro in the short term might cause investors to pull their money out of German securities, leading to lower asset values and higher interest rates — a double-whammy for wealth and economic growth.
Today, this cluster of threats is unacceptable to Germany. As its growth rate changed, so did its bankers’ priorities and, as a consequence, the balance of power in the eurozone. The Greeks figured this out, and other countries are cottoning on. But it was a good run for wealthy Germans while it lasted.
aus: FP, 2.2.2015
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